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economic	 priorities	 during	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 fourth	 presidential	 term.	
There are	at	least	three	reasons	why	the	importance	of	the	digital	econo	my	
has	 been	 rising.	 Firstly,	Russia	has	 been	promoting	 the	digital	 transfor‑





























































































I. THE DIGITAL SECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY


























Estimates	 of	 the	 size	 of	 Russia’s	 digital	 economy	 differ	 depending	 on	 the	
method	ology	adopted.	The RAEC	estimates	that	in 2019	the	digital	economy	
1	 S. Kemp,	‘Digital	2020:	The Russian	Federation’,	DataReportal,	18 February 2020,	www.datareportal.com.




4	 The monthly	 cost	 of	 a  100 Mbps	 internet	 access	 package	was	 US$  7.68	 in	 late  2019.	M.  Yarova,	
































with	global	 leaders	only	when	 it	 comes	 to	broadband	 internet	 access.	They	
lag	behind	in	the	uptake	of	the	radio	‑frequency	identification	of	persons	and	
objects	(RFID),	enterprise	resource	planning	(ERP)	and	e‑commerce.9
2. State involvement in the sector
The Russian	ICT	sector	is	considerably	centralised	with	a strong	state	presence,	






6	 Цифровая Экономика. Краткий статистический сборник,	Высшая	школа	экономики,	Москва	
2019.
























nesses	which	have	 stepped	up	 takeovers	of	private	 IT  companies.	The Stol‑
ypin	Institute	for	the	Economy	of	Growth	estimates	in	its	2018 report	(the most	
recent	 available)	 that	 in  2017,	 the	 state	 accounted	 for	 35%	of	 the	 combined	
capital	of	 the	 ICT	sector	and	for	49%	of	 the	content	 (e.g.  text,	 images,	data,	




the	 state	were	 the	main	contractors	and	 largest	 consumers	of	 IT  services.10	
The presence	of	state	‑owned	companies	in	the	sector	has	expanded	over	the	


























of	 a  friend	of	President	Putin),	 and	 the	 tracking	 system	was	 implemented	
with	a company	belonging	to	Alisher	Usmanov	(one	of	Russia’s	richest	entre‑













ment	 of  an  integrated	 telecoms	network	 for	 the	 defence,	 security	 and	 law	
enforcement	bodies.
Russia’s	largest	bank,	the	state	‑owned	Sberbank,	 is	also	becoming	a leading	












11	 ‘Ранкинг	 TAdviser100:	 Крупнейшие	 ИТ‑компании	 в  России	 2019’,	 TAdviser,	 17  May  2019,	
www.tadviser.ru.























Persons	with	 links	 to	 the	 Russian	 power	 elite	 also	 own	 companies	 tasked	
with,	 inter alia,	 developing	 Russian	‑made	 technologies.	 For	 instance,	 the	




neft,	 Gazprombank,	 Rostec	 and	 Rosatom  –	 cooperate	with	 the	 foundation.	
























































































	• the	 rise	 of	 technical	 intelligence	 targeting	 Russian	 government	 	bodies,	





































ities	 should	 increase	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	Russian	 IT  systems	 to	withstand	


























request	 of	 the	 Federal	 Security	 Service	 (FSB)	 (this	 requirement	 comes	
from	the	Yarovaya	law	named	after	Irina	Yarovaya,	one	of	the	authors	of	
the	regulation);


































for	minimising	cross	‑border	 traffic	 in	 communication	between	Russian	




The measures	 to	 ensure	 internet	 security	 have	mainly	 served	 the	 purpose	
of	 combatting	 the	 opposition	 in	 Russia,	while	 efforts	 to	 counter	 terrorism	
and	 online	 crime	 have	 been	much	 less	 effective.	 According	 to	 the	 Russian	
Prosecutor’s	 Office,	 the	 number	 of	 criminal	 acts	 involving	 the	 use	 of	mod‑
ern	technologies	has	increased	more	than	six‑fold	in	the	years	2013–2016,	and	
in 2017	increased	by	a further 30%	(compared	to 2016).	The Prosecutor’s	Office	















i.e. nearly	67%	more	 than	 in 2018,	 the	most	 frequent	 type	of	 this	 crime	con‑
sists	 in	 the	 fraudulent	 use	 of	 banking	 cards.24	 The Association	 of	 Lawyers	
of	Russia	 estimates	 that	Russia	 loses	 around	US$ 2 billion	a year	 as	 a  result	
of cybercrime.
4. The regulatory framework of the digital transformation
The need	to	build	a digital	economy	in	Russian	has	been	spelt	out	in	various	
Russian	legal	acts	over	the	last	two	years.	First,	the	process	was	announced	in	
the	“Strategy for the development of the information society in the Rus‑
sian Federation in the years 2017–2030”,	approved	by	a presidential	decree	
on	9 May 2017.25	Its	main	directions	were	described	then	in	the	governmen‑
tal	 programme “Digital economy of the Russian Federation”,	 adopted	
on	 28  July  2017	 as	 an  implementing	 document	 of	 the	 presidential	 decree.26	
The programme’s	objectives	and	timelines	of	activities	in	different	areas	were	
laid	down	in	more	detail	 in	sectoral	action	plans	developed	in	late 2017	and	
early  2018,	 for	 example	 for	 the development of information infrastruc‑
ture or the provision of information security.	The digital	transformation	
earned	its	special	status –	as	well	as	access	to	public	funds –	after	the	president	
















26	 ‘Об	 утверждении	 программы	 «Цифровая	 экономика	 Российской	 Федерации»’,	 Правитель‑
ство	России,	 31  July  2017,	www.government.ru.





































	• The “Digital Public Administration”	project	deals	with	the	 imple‑



















































ferred	 to	 a new	set	 of	people	who	have	 close	 links	 to	 the	 IT	 sector	but	not	
necessarily	degrees	 in	 the	subject,	and	who	have	successfully	 implemented	
































ment	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 is	expected	to	 increase	following	the	recent	
reshuffles.
The most important persons and bodies involved in Russia’s digital trans‑
formation currently include:
	• Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin	(born 1966).	He	took	office	on	16 Jan‑
uary 2020	and	owes	his	nomination	largely	to	positive	opinions	about	his	
performances	as	the	chief	of	the	Federal	Tax	Service.	The successful	dig‑
itisation	 of	 the	 service’s	 resources	 considerably	 improved	 its	 efficiency.	
Mishustin	was	also	in	charge	of	the	digitisation	of	Russia’s	cadastre.	His	




	• Deputy Prime Minister for Transport, Communication and  Digital 



















	• The  Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass 










































	• The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information 
































































	• The Rostec state corporation	 (see	Chapter  I.2)	 controls	approximately	
700 enterprises	from	different	sectors	of	the	economy,	mostly	the	defence	































Source:	Национальные проекты: целевые показатели и основные результаты,	op.cit.
According	 to	 the	Russian	Accounts	Chamber,	 in 2019	 the	 “Digital	Economy”	
programme’s	 implementation	was	 the	 slowest	 among	 all	 thirteen	 national	










30	 Паспорт	 национального	 проекта	Национальная	 программа	 «Цифровая	 экономика	 Россий‑
ской	Федерации»,	Министерство	цифрового	развития,	связи	и массовых	коммуникаций	Рос‑
сийской	Федерации,	30 June 2019,	www.digital.gov.ru.
Information security – RUB 30.2 billion
Human resources – RUB 143.1 billion
Regulations – RUB 1.7 billion
Digital public administration – RUB 235.7 billion
New technologies – RUB 451.8 billion















Information infrastructure New technologies Digital public administration
Human resources Information security Regulations

















































































II. RUSSIA’S 5G NETWORK DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Development	of	the	information	infrastructure,	and	especially	the	creation	of	
the	5G mobile	network,	is	the	cornerstone	of	Russia’s	digital	transformation	


























on	year).	Mobile	 communications	account	 for	 the	 largest	 share	of	 the	mar‑
ket  (55%),	 followed	by	 internet	 access	provision	 (12%)	 and	 fixed	phone	 ser‑





























	• MegaFon	 accounts	 for	 slightly	 less	 than	 30%	of	 the	market.	 Its	 	largest	
shareholder	 is	 the	USM	Group	controlled	by	one	of	Russia’s	 	wealthiest	
oligarchs	 Alisher	 Usmanov	 (USM	 Group	 holds	 56.32%	 of	 its	 shares).35	
Other	shareholders	include	Gazprombank	Group	(18.79%)	and	MegaFon	





Com	 is	 part	 of	 the	 international	 group	 VEON	 Ltd.	 The  company	 cur‑
rently	provides	services	to	around	54.3 million	users	in	Russia	and	more	
than	180 million	outside	Russia.	Its	main	shareholders	include	Letter	One,	






























2. The development of the 4G network in Russia











In  2019	 VimpelCom/Beeline	 expanded	 its	 network	 of	 base	 transceiver	 sta‑
tions	at	the	fastest	rate	(a 50%	increase),	but	it	still	has	the	smallest	number	
of	LTE stations	among	the	‘big	four’	(65,400).	Tele2	also	reported	rapid	expan‑

































































































frequencies	 officially	 allocated	 to	 them	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 developing	 the	
LTE Advanced	 standard.	 Their	 access	 to	 the	 880–960 MHz	band	 (allocated	
















for  the	purposes	 of	GSM,	 3G,	LTE Advanced)	was	 also	 limited	 in	practice.42	
Local	limitations	related	to	the	activities	of	the	Ministry	of	Defence	and	other	











Source:	 ‘Какие	частоты 4G	у  российских	операторов	—	Полный	обзор’,	 4G  connect,	 7 May  2018,	
	www.4gconnect.ru.
Since 2019,	 the	development	of	 the	LTE service	 for	bodies	providing	 impor‑
tant	 public	 services	 (including	 schools,	 medical	 facilities,	 police	 stations,	
fire	brigades etc.)	 in	rural	areas	in	Russia	has	relied	on	the	450 MHz	band.44	
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services)	and	 the	National	Guard.	Moreover,	 it	will	also	be	used	 to	provide	
broadband	internet	to	providers	of	important	public	services.











Economy”	 national	 programme	 spells	 out	 the	 programme’s	 objectives	 and	
timeline,	and	identifies	the	official	bodies	responsible	for	its	implementation.47
In accordance	with	the	timeline	presented	in	the	above	documents:




received	much	criticism	 from	business	 (see	Chapter  II.5	 for	more	 infor‑






47	 Паспорт	 национальной	 программы	 утверждён	 решением	 президиума	 Совета	 при	 Прези‑




















	• by the end of 2020	pilot	projects	should	be	initiated	concerning	the	imple‑
mentation	of	the	5G standard	in	five	key	sectors	in	cities	with	populations	
of	more	than	1 million;
	• by the end of 2021	the	conditions	for	the	mass	implementation	of	5G com‑
munications	are	to	be	defined;














































An  important	 assumption	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 5G  network,	 and	 for	
the	entire	digital	transformation	agenda,	is	that	the	process	should	be	imple‑
mented	using	Russian	technologies,	software	and	devices.	In April 2019,	the	
Ministry	of	Industry	and	Trade	presented	a draft	target programme for the 
development of industrial production for the fifth ‑generation network 












































ages,	 for	 instance,	 the	 creation	of	 a  register	 of	 IoT	 identifiers	 to	 recognise	
and	identify	the	users	of	all	networks	and	to	de facto	create	a closed	IoT	net‑










Russia’s	mobile	operators	 from	 investing	 in	 related	 technologies	and	 imple‑
menting	pilot	projects.	Those	projects	will	serve	as	a basis	to	formulate	the	
























11  cities	 in	which	 the	 2018 World	 Cup	 games	were	 organised.	 The  Russian	
operator	carried	out	 tests	on	the	3.4–3.8 GHz	band	in	cooperation	with	Chi‑
na’s		Huawei	(under	a cooperation	agreement	signed	by	the	companies	in 2014),	
and  on	higher	 frequencies	 (a  400 MHz‑wide	 channel	 in	 the	 28 GHz	 band)	
in	 cooperation	with	 Qualcomm	 Technologies  Inc.	 and	 Nokia.	 In May  2018	
	Mega	Fon	and	Nokia	 signed	a memorandum	on	strategic	 cooperation	 in	 the	
implementation	of	the	5G network	and	digital	technologies.





































5. Works on the ‘concept for the creation and development  
of the 5G/IMT‑2020 network in Russia’
In accordance	with	 the	adopted	documents	concerning	 the	development	of	
the	digital	 economy	 in	Russia,	 the ‘concept for the creation and develop‑





















































centres,	 residential	 areas	 and	 industrial	 zones	within	 the	 cities,	 and	 along	
transport	corridors.	The draft	concept	states	that,	in	order	to	comprehensively	


















would	be	 to	 implement	 the	 third	scenario,	 in	which	a single	 infrastructure	












































tancy54	which,	in	the	autumn	of 2018,	prepared	an alternative draft concept 
for the creation and development of the 5G network in Russia,	commis‑
sioned	by	the	LTE Union	(an association	of	Russian	LTE operators).












































tronics,	 and	 IT  companies	who	 argued	 that	 the	 proposed	 state	 support	 for	
















































of	this,	in	Moscow 41 29 16
























be	used	 for	 this	purpose,	 the	cities	where	 the	 implementation	of	 5G	would	
be	 economically	 viable,	 a  cost	 estimate	 of	 the	 conversion	 process,	 and	 the	
potential	sources	of	financing.58	According	to	press	reports,	the	ministry	offi‑
cials	overseeing	the	preparation	of	the	plan	refused	to	accept	the	document	
delivered	due	to	 its	 low	quality,	and	in	 January 2020	they	were	dismissed.59	
No information	is	available	on	what	happened	next	with	the	study.	The pro‑
posed	conversion	plan	has	not	been	published.






	• below 1  GHz:	 those	 frequencies	 are	 crucial	 for	 overcoming	 physical	
obstacles	 (hills,	 walls,	 large	 distances).	 They	 enable	 large	 area	 cover‑
age	to	be	built	and	are	useful	especially	for	network	development	in	the	




























lar	decision	yet	even	though	all documents adopted so far point to the 
700 MHz band as necessary for the functioning of the 5G infrastruc‑
ture and suggest that its current users should be transferred to lower 
frequencies. It  is also assumed that each operator will need a band‑

























61	 Decision	 (EU)	2017/899	of	 the	European	Parliament	and	of	 the	Council	of	 17 May 2017	on	 the	use	































cies	 along	Russia’s	western	border,	no	disturbance	 should	be	 caused	 to	 the	
signal	of	5G transmitters	in	neighbouring	countries	(assuming	that	the	5G net‑




DTT	multiplexes.	 In  July 2020	 the	State	Commission	 for	Radio	Frequencies	
extended	 their	 right	 to	 use	 this	 frequency	 range	 to	 19 August  2021.63	How‑











































































Digital terrestrial television transmitters
located close to Russia’s borders
with countries of the European
Economic Area
Transmitters and frequencies – a selection:
Alakurtti: 506 MHz (I), 546 MHz (II)
Borisoglebsky: 762 MHz (I), 674 MHz (II)
Chernyshevskoye: 602 MHz (I), 586 MHz (II)
Elisenvaara: 482 MHz (I), 674 MHz (II)
Glubokoye: 514 MHz (I), 594 MHz (II)
Yemilovo: 554 MHz (I), 578 MHz (II)
Kalevala: 506 MHz (I), 602 MHz (II)
Kaliningrad: 682 MHz (I), 586 MHz (II)
Kalinino: 602 MHz (I), 586 MHz (II)
Kingisepp: 546 MHz (I), 562 MHz (II)
Kostomuksha: 482 MHz (I), 570 MHz (II)
Kovdor: 474 MHz (I), 618 MHz (II)
Krasnogorodskoye: 554 MHz (I), 578 MHz (II)
Krasnoznamensk: 602 MHz (I), 586 MHz (II)
Lendery: 530 MHz (I), 562 MHz (II)
Mamonovo: 682 MHz (I), 586 MHz (II)
Naystenyarvi: 722 MHz (I), 594 MHz (II)
Nikel: 762 MHz (I), 674 MHz (II)
Nikolshchina (Lavry): 698 MHz (I), 754 MHz (II)
Ostrov: 554 MHz (I), 578 MHz (II)
St. Petersburg: 586 MHz (I), 666 MHz (II)
Pechenga: 762 MHz (I), 674 MHz (II)
Puykkola: 482 MHz (I), 674 MHz (II)
Rayakoski: 474 MHz (I), 666 MHz (II)
Reboly: 530 MHz (I), 562 MHz (II)
Ruskeala: 482 MHz (I), 674 MHz (II)
Sebezh: 514 MHz (I), 594 MHz (II)
Slantsy: 546 MHz (I), 562 MHz (II)
Sofporog: 482 MHz (I), 514 MHz (II)
Sortavala: 482 MHz (I), 674 MHz (II)
Sovetsk: 602 MHz (I), 586 MHz (II)
Svetogorsk: 498 MHz (I), 722 MHz (II)
Trutnevo: 498 MHz (I), 514 MHz (II)
Vaulino (Pskov): 698 MHz (I), 754 MHz (II)
Vyartsilya: 722 MHz (I), 594 MHz (II)
Verkhnetulomsky: 490 MHz (I), 658 MHz (II)
Veselovka: 602 MHz (I), 586 MHz (II)
Vyborg: 498 MHz (I), 722 MHz (II)
Zapolyarny: 762 MHz (I), 674 MHz (II)
Zarechensk: 594 MHz (I), 530 MHz (II)
Zheleznodorozhny: 682 MHz (I), 586 MHz (II)
Digital terrestrial television transmitters
emitting a signal in the 694–790 MHz band
and their frequencies are marked in red.
The number of the Russian Television
and Radio Broadcasting Network (RTRN)
multiplex is given in parentheses.
Borders of frequency zones in the Russian














Until the 700 MHz range is reserved for the development of the Russian 
5G network and freed by its current users (especially DTT), the devel‑
opment of 5G networks in neighbouring European countries, including 





























































	• radio	 communication,	 including	 base	 stations	 providing	 fixed	wireless	
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vene	with	regard	 to	 the	negative	position	of	 the	Ministry	of	Defence.	How‑
ever,	despite	his	previous	declarations	about	the	high	priority	of	the	digital	


























72	 See	 the	 interview	 with	 Deputy	 Prime	Minister	 Yury	 Borisov:	 ‘Вице‑премьер	Юрий	 Борисов:	













III. PROSPECTS OF RUSSIA’S DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 
AND CONCLUSIONS
The actions	taken	so	far	to	implement	the	“Digital	Economy”	programme	in	
Russia,	 and	 especially	 to	 develop	 the	 5G mobile	 network,	 indicate	 that	 the	
Kremlin	 is	genuinely	willing	 to	 finance	 the	undertaking	and	 involve	 indus‑
try	partners	in	its	implementation.	However,	several	issues	raise	doubt	about	
whether	the	digital	transformation	can	accomplish	its	ambitious	objectives.
Firstly,	the contradictory interests of the various actors involved have 























































Secondly,	Russia’s current economic model considerably diminishes the 









companies	 (Rostec,	Rosatom)	 there.	The government	has	also	been	 increas‑
ingly	positive	about	the	plans	to	create	a ‘sovereign’	internet,	i.e. a centralised	





















Thirdly,	a rivalry continues between the various state institutions for 













Moreover,	the shortage of Russian technologies will be a serious barrier 
for the Russian digital transformation.	 According	 to	 the	 governmental	





































Finally,	many of the technological solutions implemented by companies 
under state contracts turn out to mainly generate burdens on those com‑






















































































Operator Frequencies in MHz (uplink / downlink) Technology Band
1. Yota	(MegaFon) 2500–2530	/	2620–2650 FDD Band 7
2. MegaFon 2530–2540	/	2650–2660 FDD Band 7
3. MegaFon* 2575–2595 TDD Band 38
4. MTS 2540–2550	/	2660–2670 FDD Band 7
5. MTS* 2595–2615 TDD Band 38
6. Beeline 2550–2560	/	2670–2680 FDD Band 7
7. Rostelecom/Tele2 2560–2570	/	2680–2690 FDD Band 7
8. Rostelecom/Tele2** 832–839.5	/	791–798.5 FDD Band 20
9. MTS** 839.5–847	/	798.5–806 FDD Band 20
10. MegaFon** 847–854.5	/	806–813.5 FDD Band 20
11. Beeline** 854.5–862	/	813.5–821 FDD Band 20
12. MTS*** 2595–2620 TDD Band 38
13. Tele2 453–457.4	/	463–467.4 FDD Band 31
	*	 Frequencies	allocated	for	use	solely	in	Moscow	and	the	Moscow	Oblast.























1. Yota	(MegaFon) Novosibirsk 2.6 GHz Huawei 2011
2. Yota	(MegaFon) Krasnodar 2.6 GHz;	
800 MHz
Huawei 2012




4. Yota	(MegaFon) Sochi 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
5. Yota	(MegaFon) Samara 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
6. Yota	(MegaFon) Vladivostok 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
7. Yota	(MegaFon) Ufa 2.6 GHz;	
800 MHz
Huawei 2012
8. Yota	(MegaFon) Kazan 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
9. Yota	(MegaFon) Kostroma 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
10. Yota	(MegaFon) Tula 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
11. Yota	(MegaFon) Vladimir 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
12. Yota	(MegaFon) Khabarovsk 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
13. Yota	(MegaFon) Orenburg 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012
14. Yota	(MegaFon) Krasnoyarsk 2.6 GHz Huawei 2012


















16. MegaFon Makhachkala 2.6 GHz Huawei 2014






18. MTS Vladivostok 2.6 GHz;	
1.8 GHz
Huawei 2014
















23. MTS Ryazan 2.6 GHz NSN 2014
24. MTS Tver 2.6 GHz NSN 2014





Source:	 ‘Какие	частоты 4G	у  российских	операторов	—	Полный	обзор’,	 4G  connect,	 7 May  2018,	
	www.4gconnect.ru.
